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4Taking Responsibility Seriously: The Best Interests of the Child and 
Spousal Laws 
Shahar Lifshitz• ** 
I. Introduction 
 
Scholars and teachers of family law tend to divide this field into two main subcategories: spousal 
law and parent and child law.1
Spousal law regulates the legal relationship between spouses. It includes, inter alia, marriage law 
(for example, who may marry whom); the law of the ongoing marriage, i.e. the mutual rights and 
duties of the spouses; divorce law; cohabitant law; spousal support and property relations 
between spouses.    
 
Parent and child law deals with the relationship between parents and children. It includes inter 
alia: the legal definition of parents; the legal rights, duties and responsibilities of parents to their 
children (i.e. the duty of the parent to support his child); the boundaries of the State’s 
intervention in the parent-child relationship; custody and adoption law. In general, parent-child 
law focuses on the parent-child relationship and consequently does not directly regulate the 
relationship of the parents inter se. Nonetheless, important components of parent-child law (for 
example, support law, custody law and visitation law) do deal with the division of the legal 
rights, duties and responsibilities of the parents. In this respect, beyond regulating parent-child 
relationships, parent-child law also regulates the relationship between the parents themselves 
(called here - joint parents law). 
 
Among modern lawmakers and scholars the prevailing trend is to distinguish between the 
ideologies that guide or ought to guide the regulation of the spousal relationship of the parents, 
on one hand, and the ideologies that guide the regulation of parenthood, including joint 
parenthood, on the other. 
 
In the spousal context, liberal (individualist and private) approaches guide legal regulation. 
Consequently, the law is expected to respect each partner’s freedom of contract and the right of 
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1 This distinction is well-known in legal literature. For example, in the famous Blackstone Commentaries on 
the Common Law, separate chapters are devoted to husband and wife law. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, (A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765-1769, Chicago, 
1979) Parent-child law as a distinct category can also be found in modern family law “text-books”, see, for example, 
Stephen M. Cretney et al., PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW (7th ed., 2002) Part V. See also L. J. Harris & L.E. 
Teitelbaum, FAMILY LAW  (2nd ed, 2000) Part III. See also Pinhas Shiman, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL  (Vol. 2 
1989 ) (in Hebrew).  
 
5each partner to exit unilaterally from spousal ties and obligations. In the parenthood context, the 
best interest of the child is the primary consideration. The terminology of parental responsibility 
has gradually replaced the concept of parental rights and consequently, in many cases, the 
parents' needs, will and interests including their freedom of contract and their right to exit are 
subordinate to the best interest of the child. 
 
This article calls for a rethinking of the modern boundaries between the regulation of spousal 
relations and the regulation of parenthood, including joint parenthood. My main argument is that 
important legal rules that are currently at the core of spousal law possess a dramatic influence on 
children’s lives. Thus, I will critique the current legal regulation that limits the influence of the 
best interests of the child principle to the regime of law that is currently classified as parent law 
but almost completely ignores its application in regimes currently classified as spousal law.         
 
As noted, this article supports broadening the influence of the best-interest principle beyond its 
traditional territory (namely, parent-child law). However, we cannot deny that there must be a 
substantial difference between the ordinary role of the best interest of the child in the context of 
parenthood law (for example, custody law) and its role in the context of spousal law (for 
example, divorce law). In the context of parenthood law, the best interest of the child is a 
primary or even a paramount consideration which overwhelms the parents’ needs and will. In 
contrast, in the context of spousal law, the parents’ rights must also be accorded significant 
weight. Consequently, in this article we shall try to find the proper balance between the rights of 
the parents and the best interests of the children in different areas of spousal law. 
 
Apart from the theoretical discussion concerning the ideal law, we shall also discuss the current 
positive law (state laws and international laws, especially the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child). In this context we will criticize legal arrangements that limit the influence of the best 
interest of the child principle to the traditional territory of parenthood law. Nonetheless, in the 
spirit of Dworkin’s aspiration to present the existing law in its best light,2 I will also try to 
suggest interpretations of the existing law that allow us to overcome the current dichotomy 
between spousal law and parenthood law.  In this context, a unique attention dedicates to the 
phrase actions concerning children, which define in which law's area the best interest of the 
child should be a primary consideration. We oppose the current rigid dichotomy between 
children – parent's law which considered to be actions concerning children in which the best 
interest of the child is the primary, if not the only consideration, to spousal law which is not 
considered actions concerning children and therefore the interest of the child, is almost 
neglected. We suggest replacing this rigid distinction with flexible formulation, which tries to 
identify the best interest of the child in different aspect of life and to balance this interest with the 
interests of other parties of the family. 
 
In the final section, we return to a theoretical analysis of the tension that exists between parental 
responsibilities and spouse’s rights. We conclude by proposing a possible application of the 
framework developed in this article to the broader tension that exists between rights and 
responsibilities in contemporary society.  
 
2 See Ronald Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) 52-53. 
6II. Historical Background: The Common Ethos of Traditional Family Law    
 
Traditionally, most Western countries based the legal regulation of the family on a public 
approach.3 This approach originated from feudal concepts which perceived the family as a 
patriarchal unit.4
Thus, the feudal world was subject to authorities organized in a hierarchical structure. The 
hierarchical structure was committed to the view of the whole of human society as one unit. In 
feudal society the individual was not viewed as an atomic entity but as part of a whole system of 
community and society; a society in which everyone had a predefined role and where all the 
participants were mutually committed. The second component of feudal thinking held that in 
feudal society the group and not the individual formed the basic entity. Consequently, feudal 
society was subdivided into groups and subgroups, each of which was perceived as a hierarchal 
unit organized in such a way as to form a microcosm of the larger society. 
 
The feudal family integrated well into the structure of society.5 The family formed a hierarchal 
unit. At the head of the family stood the father and subordinated to him were his wife and 
children. Family members had well defined roles and well defined obligations with respect to 
each other. 
 
Historians usually tag the 11th – 13th centuries as the second feudal period in the history of 
Western Europe. In the early 14th century a gradual disintegration of the feudal structure began 
and with the collapse of the feudal configuration a general social transformation took place. This 
transformation is eloquently presented by Lord Main in his famous depiction of the history of 
social evolvement: “The individual is steadily substituted for the family as the unit of which civil 
laws take account.”6
However, despite these shifts, for a long time the family continued to be perceived as a unit 
rather than as a collection of individuals and the individual members of the family were 
subjugated to the family.  
 
In the common law these issues are clearly expressed in the doctrines of unity and merger which 
dominate spousal law. Thus, according to the common law, marriage causes the husband and 
wife to be viewed merging into one unit. As a result of the union, the legal personality of the 
 
3 See S. Lifshitz, CONTRACTUAL REGULATION OF SPOUSAL RELATIONSHIP IN CIVIL LAW 
(thesis toward a Ph.D. degree, Bar Ilan, 5762) Part I Ch. 2-3. 
4 See Mark Bloch, FEUDAL SOCIETY (London, 2nd ed., 1965); see also JANET L. DOGLIN, “The Family 
in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond”, 82 GEO. L. J. (1994) 1519, 1524 et seq.; Frances E. Olsen, 
“The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform”, 96 HARV. L. REV. (1983) 1497, 1513-1514. 
5 See Doglin, ibid,  ibid; Olsen, ibid , at 1516; Robert Fossier, “The Feudal Era (Eleventh-Thirteenth 
Century)” in Andre Burguiere et al. (eds.) HISTORY OF THE FAMILY, (Vol. I, Paris, 1986, Trans. Sarah H. 
Tenision, Cambridge, 1996) 407; Bloch, supra note 4 at 123-142. But cf. Lawrence Stone, THE FAMILY SEX 
AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800 (abridged edition , New York, 1979). In contrast to scholars who 
emphasize the family as a closed unit, Stone emphasizes the vulnerability of a family to external influences in the 
Middle Ages. Stone describes the family during this period as an “open lineage family”. 
6 See Henry S. Maine, ANCIENT LAW, ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF 
SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (4th America ed. from 10 London ed. New York, 1906) 1. 
7wife merges with that of her husband and consequently she looses her legal status, her control 
over her assets and most of her legal capacity. The law relates to the consolidated unit.7 The 
unitary nature of Western spousal law is manifested in the severe restrictions imposed on divorce 
as well as the fact that even following dissolution of marriage the link between the parties is not 
completely severed as the husband’s obligation to pay alimony to his wife continues to apply.8
The family hierarchical structure has also influenced the evolution of parent-child law. Thus, 
parents possessed quasi-property rights in their children.9 These rights enabled the parents to 
dominate their children’s lives. 10 Consequently, it was clear that children could not lead their 
lives as autonomous beings. On the contrary, children were expected to obey their parents11 and 
indeed the ability of the parents to shape their children’s lives continued even when they 
matured.12 
In the beginning of the 19th century, spousal laws were influenced by a process favoring 
individualism. This trend was most prominently expressed in legislation enacted in the United 
 
7 This is how Blackstone describes the theory: 
“By marriage the husband and wife are ‘one person in law’ that is the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband”. See 
Blackstone supra note 1, at 430. 
 There is a large volume of literature which describes the doctrine and its ramifications for women. For a 
discussion of this doctrine in the context of English law, see, for example, Brenda Hoggett, “Ends and Means: The 
Utility of Marriage as a Legal Institution” in MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIETIES (Toronto, John M Elkelaar & Stanford N Kaats eds., 1980) 94, 195, and the references in note 8. For 
the doctrine in the United States, see Hendrik Hartog, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA - A HISTORY (Cambridge, 
2000) 103-107 & 115-117.  
8 See Lawrence Stone, ROAD TO DIVORCE - ENGLAND 1530-1987 (1990); John Witte, FROM 
SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE RELIGION AND LAW IN WESTERN TRADITION (Louisville, 
1997). 
9 See Mary A. Mason, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS ( Cambridge  1994); 
John M. Eekelaar, “The Emergence of Children’s Rights” 6 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES (1986) 
161; Florence Kaslow, “Children who Sue Parents” in FAMILY IN TREATMENT: THE POST LAUNCHING 
YEARS 351-352. 
10 See John Demos, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY (London, 
1975) 100 et seq.; Jean L. Flandrin, FAMILIES IN FORMER TIMES: KINSHIP HOUSEHOLD AND 
SEXUALITY (Cambridge, Richard Southren, Trans., 1979) 131-140; Steven Ozment, WHEN FATHER RULED 
FAMILY: LIFE IN REFORMATION EUROPE (Cambridge, 1983). At the same time it should be noted that 
concurrently with the recognition of the father’s control of his children, this period saw the beginning of the 
development – at least in Protestant countries – of ideas concerning parents’ obligations towards their children 
particularly to support and educate them. 
11 See BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, (4th ed. 1770) Book1 Ch. 15 
sec. 2. 
12 Thus, for example, there were places in which family laws in the past vested parents with the right of veto 
over their offspring’s choice of spouse, out of the need to protect family estates. Note that the legal requirement of 
parental involvement in the marriage ceremony persisted in various countries in Europe through to the end of the 
18th century! See, for example, Mary A. Glendon, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE LAW 
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (Chicago, 1989) 35-36. Even the 
Napoleonic Code of 1804 contained a requirement of parental consent for the marriage of young persons (men under 
the age of 25 and women under the age of 21) and the obligation to consult with parents prior to marriage even when 
the couple involved was above that age. For this, see Dagmar Coester-Waltjen & Michael Coester, “Formation of 
Marriage” in “Persons and the Family”, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mary 
Ann Glendon ed., 1997, Vol. IV,  Chap. 3) 16-17. 
8States and in the United Kingdom repealing the doctrine of merger between the respective legal 
personalities of the husband and wife. The repeal of the doctrine meant that married women 
could acquire and manage their own property, sue, be sued, enter into contracts and engage in 
business activities.13 
In the field of parenthood law the trend towards individualism began even earlier, towards the 
end of the 18th century. In this period lawmakers understood that the child was not the property 
of his parents. Consequently, parents’ rights were interpreted as a legal device for enabling the 
parents to act in the best interest of their children.14 
However, despite these changes, until the beginning of the 20th century the public, unitary and 
non-egalitarian approach continued to characterize family law.15 
It seems that the common ethos of spousal law and parenthood law was the basis for the coherent 
regulation of the family relationship. Thus, for example, the hierarchical approach created a 
familial role based on gender. These legal-familial roles influenced both spousal law and parent-
child law. Consequently, in the context of spousal law the husband had the duty to provide for 
his wife while the wife had the duty to obey her husband. In the same spirit, in the context of 
parent-child law the husband had the duty to provide for his children while the mother had the 
duty to take care of the children at home and the law also preferred mothers in custody disputes. 
 
The unit approach also had an impact on spousal law and parenthood law. 
The influence of unit ideology on both areas of family law may be exemplified by the “non-
intervention in the family” doctrine. Until recently, this doctrine dominated family law and 
reflected the perception of the family as an autonomous entity. 16 The doctrine prevented 
individuals who made up the family unit (namely, spouses and children) from realizing their 
legal rights during the marriage even when these legal rights were violated by a stronger family 
member (as usually happened in cases of domestic violence). It is clear, therefore, that this 
doctrine reflected the preference accorded to the family unit over the rights of the individuals 
who constitute that unit. 
 
13 For this development in the United States, see; Lawrence M. Friedman, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
LAW (New York, 2nd ed, 1985) 208-211; Carl N. Degler, AT ODDS - WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN 
AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (Oxford, 1980) 332 et seq. For similar developments 
in England see R. H. Graveson, “The Background of the Century” in A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW 1857-1957 
(London, R.H. Graveson & F. R. Crane eds., 1957) 1, 15-17. 
14 John M. Eekelaar, “From ‘Privacy’ to the Leviathan State; The Case of the Child”, THE EUROPEAN 
FAMILY - THE FAMILY QUESTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, (Jacques Commaille & Francois de 
Singly eds., 1997) 205 (hereafter: Eekelaar - Leviathan); see also Kaslow, supra note 9, at 352-354; as well as John 
M. Eekelaar, “Families and Children: From Welfarism to Rights” in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN 
BRITAIN (ed. Mccrudden & Chambers )301,  323-332(hereafter: Eekelaar Welfarism). 
15 See Witte, supra note 7 at 203-204; Harry Willekens, “Long Term Development in Family Law in Western 
Europe: An Explanation” in THE CHANGING FAMILY: FAMILY FORMS & FAMILY LAW (Oxford, John 
Eekelaar & Thandabantu Nhlapo eds., 1998) 47, 50-51; Lifshitz, supra note 3, chapter 3 section 7, all of whom 
emphasize the similarities between family laws in the beginning of the 20th century and family laws in the 16th 
century. 
16 For this doctrine and its influence on spousal law and parenthood law, see Frances E. Olsen, “The Myth of 
State Intervention in The Family”, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 835 (1985); Frances E. Olsen, “The Family and the 
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform”, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); see also Eekelaar (Leviathan), 
supra note 14; Eekelaar (Welfarism), supra note 14 at 311-312 and Kaslow, supra note 9 at 353. 
9The unit approach also impacted both areas of family law in the context of the limitations 
imposed on individual rights to exit from family ties. Thus, divorce law dramatically limited the 
ability of the spouses to dissolve the marriage 17 and in any event no divorce was absolute due to 
the economic obligation of the ex-husband to support his children18 and his ex-wife 19after the 
divorce. 
 
The public aspect of family regulation also reflected the similarities between the regulation of the 
spousal relationship and the regulation of parenthood. Thus, both spousal law and parent-child 
law formed part of the public “agenda” aimed at channelling people into the framework of 
marriage.20 In this context traditional spousal law denied any legal rights to unmarried 
cohabitees.21 Parent-child law also participated in the struggle to channel people into marriage 
and children born out of wedlock were considered to be illegitimate.22 It is clear, therefore, that 
according to traditional family law, beyond the influence exerted by the spousal relationship of 
the parents on their own mutual rights and obligations, the spousal relationship also exerted an 
influence on their definition as parents! The spousal relationship influenced the definition of a 
person  as a parents  in other respects as well: According to traditional law a legal presumption 
existed to the effect that the husband was the father of children born to his wife during the 
marriage. This presumption remained valid even when it was clear in the circumstance that the 
husband was not the biological father. 23 
The “public attitude” to family issues contributed to the blurring of the boundaries between the 
regulation of the spousal relationship and the regulation of parenthood in yet another respect. 
One of the outstanding implications of the “public approach” lay in making the concept of 
“fault” relevant to family issues. According to traditional law, public evaluation of spousal 
behavior had legal implications.24 Consequently, the ability to get divorced and the economic 
consequences of the divorce were based on the fault model. Moreover, the classification of a 
spouse as the guilty party affected his chances of becoming the custodian parent.25 This meant 
 
17 See R. Phillips, “Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society” (Cambridge, 1998) 403-478; 
and S.M. Cretney, J.M. Masson & R. Bailey-Harris, PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW (London, 7th ed. 2002) 269-
271. 
18 See Cretney, Masson & Bailey-Harris, ibid at et seq.
19 Margaret F. Brining & June R. Carbone, “The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce”, 62 TUL. L. 
REV (1988) 855; Cretney, Masson & Bailey-Harris, ibid, at 341-342; Glendon, supra note12, at 197-207; I.M. 
Ellman, “The Theory of Alimony”, 77 CAL. L. REV. (1989). 
20 For the channeling function of family law, see Carl E. Schneider, “The Channeling Function in Family 
Law”, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992). 
21 See Glendon, supra note 12, at 252-254. 
22 See Willekens,  supra note 15, 48–50; M. Grossberg, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE 
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Chapel Hill, G. E. White ed., 1985) Ch. 7. 
23 See Traci Dallas, “Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test”, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 369, at 370-371. (The marital presumption was known as 'Lord Mansfield’s Rule' and provided that a 
woman’s husband was the father of all children born during the marriage. This presumption was based on notions of 
morality and decency). See also S.M Cretney, J.M. Masson & R. Bailey-Harris ,supra note 17,   524 and the famous 
case of Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
24 Traditional  divorce law enabled only the innocent spouse to sue for divorce and to obtain alimony, see R. 
Phillips, supra note 17. 403-478;  
25 See Altman Scott, “Should Child Custody Rules be Fair?” 35. U. OF LOUISVILLE OF FAM. L. 325 
(1996) 333. 
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that spousal behavior legally classified as “faulty conduct” had crucial implications not only in 
the context of spousal law but also in the context of parenthood law.    
 
To summarize, despite the general recognition of the division of family law into spousal law and 
parenthood law, traditional law integrated the regulation of the two fields. Consequently, spousal 
relations and conduct had dramatic implications for the regulation of the relationships between 
parents and spouses and even on the legal definition of a person as a parent. 
 
III. From Partner to Parents: The Modern Distinction Between Parenthood 
and Spousal Law 
 
A. The Individualization of Modern Family Law 
Western family law was dramatically transformed during the second half of the 20th  
century.26 In this period the conservative, unit, non egalitarian ethos was replaced by a liberal, 
individualistic, egalitarian ethos. The trend that evolved was one which deprived the family unit 
of its legal significance.27 Accordingly, the law treated the individual not as a member of a 
family but as an autonomous entity,28 who had the capacity and the right to create ties, determine 
their substance and ultimately rescind them. 
 
This liberal-individualistic trend is today reflected in almost all aspects of modern spousal laws.
29 
Entry into marriage is based upon decisions of individuals30and is not subjugated (as it was in the 
past) to the limitations and needs of the original family unit; the “independent” status of the 
partners is preserved even after the marriage. In this framework, rules which established special 
 
26 For the dramatic changes which took place to spousal laws in the second half of the 20th century, see 
Glendon 1989, supra note 12; Lifshitz, supra note 3, Ch. 4;  
27 See Glendon, ibid, at 102-103. In summary, we have noted the emergence of new legal images of the 
family which to varying degrees stress the separate personalities of the family members rather than the unitary 
aspect of the family. See also Frances E. Olsen, “The Politics of Family Law”, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. (1984) 1, 8. 
According to Olsen the change is “from the family as a corporate unit to the family as a voluntary association of 
individuals”. See also Elizabeth S. Scott, “Rehabilitation Liberalism and Modern Divorce”, UTAH L. REV. (1994) 
687. 
28 See Salvatore Patti, “Intra-Family Torts”, PERSONS AND THE FAMILY - INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 7 (Mary Ann Glendon ed., Vol. IV, Ch.9, 1998) at 437,  
29 A description of the changes in modern spousal laws in the terminology of individualization is well 
accepted in Western literature, see, for example, Stephen J. Morse, “Family Law in Transition: From Traditional 
Families to Individual Liberty” in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY (New Haven, Virginia Tufte & 
Barbara G., eds., 1979) 319, 320-322; Marjone M. Shultz, “Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for 
State Policy”, 70 CAL. L. REV. (1982) 204, 275-280; Martha Minow, “’Forming Underneath Everything that 
Grows’ Toward History of Family Law”, 1985 WIS. LAW REV. 819, 833; Jana B. Singer, “The Privatization of 
Family Law”, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1462-1465; Doglin, supra note 4, at 1553; Anne C. Dailey, “Constitutional 
Privacy and the Just Family”, 67 TUL. L. REV. (1993) 955, 972-978; Martha A. Fineman, THE ILLUSION OF 
EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (Chicago, 1991) 18.  
30 For these trends in the United States, see Singer, ibid, at 1465-1470. For a review of the trends in central 
Western countries in this connection, see Glendon, supra note 12, at 33-75, as well as Lynn D. Wardle, 
“International Marriage and Divorce Regulation and Recognition: A Survey”, 29 FAM. L. Q. (1996) 497, 500-502. 
11
consequences for marriages have been cancelled, so that in many cases the legal status of the 
partners with respect to one another is one of two independent individuals having no special 
bond.31 
This “individualistic” arrangement is manifest, in particular, in modern divorce laws: the ease of 
divorce and especially the transition to divorce on demand. The significance of this is that 
individuals now have the right to sever themselves from the family framework.32 In the United 
States a number of decisions of the Supreme Court are interpreted as conferring constitutional 
status upon this right.33 The commitment to individualistic principles is also reflected in the 
“clean-break principle”34 which states that upon divorce there is an obligation to completely 
sever the partners’ mutual economic obligations. 
 
The individualistic trend also influences parent-child law. Consequently, during the 20th century 
the traditional approaches that perceived the father as the owner of the children or as an 
autonomous leader were abandoned. 35 The modern alternative is to prohibit an instrumental 
attitude toward children with the result that the best interest of the child, which emphasizes the 
status of the child as autonomous individual, has become the primary consideration in the 
regulation of parenthood. 36 Furthermore, while the unit approach inspired the non–intervention 
 
31 Singer, ibid, at 1465 and Lifshitz, supra note 3 at chapter 4 section 3.3 c). 
 In the words of Justice Brennan in Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) at 453: 
“It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is 
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a 
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person.” 
32 See Wardle  supra note 30 at 51, “clearly the contract terminated at will by either spouse model of marriage 
(defined by no fault divorce laws) is the dominant model of marriage in the world today”. See also Valerio Pocar & 
Palona Ronfani, “From Institution to Self-Regulation” in THE EUROPEN FAMILY: THE FAMILY QUESTION 
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Dordrecht, Jacques Commaile & Francois de Singly eds., 1997) 195, 196 
(these authors identify the same trends in Europe). The trend towards easing divorce laws is also identified by 
Glendon 1989, supra note 39 at 148-197. 
33 See Cathy J. Jones, “The Rights to Marry and Divorce: A New Look at Some Unanswered Questions”, 63 
WASH. U.L. Q (1985) 577. 
34 For the establishment of the clean-break principle as a supra-principle, to which the no-fault divorce 
process must aspire, see Herma H. Kay, “An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law”, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
(1987) 291, 313. This principle is also recognized by the case law in various Western countries, see, for example,
Turner v. Turner 385 A.2d 1280, 1281. (N.J., 1978) “The law should provide both parties with the opportunity to 
make a new life…”; see also the comments of the Canadian Judge Wilson in the well-known case Pelech v. Pelech 7 
Rfl (3d) 225, 271 (Scc), “To burden the respondent with her care … for no other reason than that they were once 
husband and wife seems to me to create a fiction of marital responsibility at the expense of individual responsibility. 
I believe that the courts must recognize the right of the individual to end a relationship as well as begin one and 
should not, when all other aspects of the relationship have long since ceased, treat the financial responsibility as 
continuing indefinitely into the future.” See further the remarks of Lord Scarman in the case of Minton v. Minton 
[1979] AC 593, 608, who described the clean break principle and the couple’s desire to turn their back on the past 
and start a new life, as fundamental elements of modern alimony laws. 
35 See John M. Eekelaar, “The Emergence of Children’s Rights”, 6 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL 
STUDIES (1986) 161; Eekelaar (Leviathan), supra note 14;. Mason, supra note 9. 
36 See Philip Alston (ed.), THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD:  RECONCILING CULTURE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford 1994); Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert. J. Solnit, BEYOND THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (New-York, 1979). See also Joseph Goldstein, Albert J. Solnit & Anna Freud, THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE (New York, 1996). 
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doctrine which prevented children from suing their parents and even denied them the protection 
of criminal law, modern family law has shown a much greater readiness to intervene in family 
matters when such intervention is needed to protect children. 37 
The modern discourse on children rights38 is a discrete example of the individualistic nature of 
parent-child law. This discourse is based on a perception of the child as an autonomous entity 
who is entitled to general human rights and to unique rights which are connected to his needs as 
a child. 39 Furthermore, in contrast to the paternalistic nature of the best interest of the child 
principle which enables adults to manage the child’s life, the rights discourse emphasizes the 
importance of the participation of the child in decisions connected to his life-style and 
direction.40 It is clear, therefore, that this is an individualistic discourse which emphasizes that 
the parents and their child are separate entities.41 Against this background even the right to exit 
which dominates modern spousal law influences parent-child law and consequently some 
western cases deal with children who want to divorce themselves from their parents.42 
B. The opposite direction of Parent-Child Law and Spousal Law 
 
There can be no doubt that a basic resemblance exists between the process of liberalization and 
individualization which affected parent-child law and spousal law respectively in the 20th 
century. Nonetheless, in this section I shall consider these issues from a different perspective 
which exposes the tension between the processes occurring in these two spheres. I shall refer to a 
number of ways in which the process of liberalization and individualization of spousal law has 
taken a divergent course to developments in parent-child laws. 
 
37 For example, Anita L. Allen, “And - Privacy isn’t everything: Accountability as a personal and social 
good”, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1375, 2003 (the author discusses the beating of children and the State). However, even the 
modern law is influenced by the traditional hesitation regarding harmful intervention in the family. See, for example, 
the English Children Act of 1989. See, Glendon (1989), supra note 12, at 102-103.  
38 See Michael Freeman, THE MORAL STATUS OF CHILDREN: ESSAYS ON THE RIGHTS OF THE 
CHILD (Dordrecht,1997); Michael Freeman & Philip Veerman (eds.), THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN‘S 
RIGHTS (Dordrecht,1992); Michael Freeman (ed.) CHILDREN‘S  RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
(Aldershot, 1996);  Philip Alston et el, (eds.) CHILDRENS RIGHTS AND THE LAW (Oxford, 1992); Bob Franklin 
(ed.), THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (Oxford,1986); Geraldine V. Bueren, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON 
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (Dordrecht, 1995) 118; Jane  Fortin, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND THE 
DEVELOPING LAW (London, 1998); Andrew Bainham, CHILDREN - THE MODERN LAW (Bristol ,2nd ed., 
1998) 78 et seq.
39 See supra note 38. For the classification of different kinds of children’s rights, see also Eekelaar – 
welfarism, supra note 14, at 326-332.  
40 Thus, in some respects, there is a tension between children’s right and the best interests of the child, see 
Purdy, IN THEIR BEST INTEREST? THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (Ithaca, 1992). 
See also in this context, Y. Kaplan, “The right of a minor in Israel to participate in the decision-making process 
concerning his or her medical treatment” 25 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (2002) 1085.  
41 On the individualistic nature of children’s rights, see Katharine T. Bartlett, “Re-expressing Parenthood” 98 
YALE LAW JOURNAL (1988) 293. For suggestions for redefining children’s rights in relational terms, see Martha  
Minow, “Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children’s Rights” 9 HARVARD WOMEN’S L. 
J. (1986) 1 and Y. Ronen, “Redefining the Child’s Rights to Identity”, 18 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW, 
POLICY AND THE FAMILY (2004) 147.   
42 For a critical discussion of these cases, see M. Freeman, “Can Children Divorce their Parents” in Michael 
D. A. Freeman (ed.), DIVORCE – WHERE NEXT? (1996) 159. 
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i) Independence Versus Responsibility  
 
In the area of spousal relations, the significance of individualization and the approach which 
regards each partner as an autonomous individual has been to lessen the mutual commitments 
and responsibilities of the spouses both during marriage and following its dissolution. 43 In 
contrast, the modern attitude towards the child as an autonomous being has not had the result of 
diminishing parental responsibilities and commitments towards the child. On the contrary, the 
attitude of modern law regarding the best interest of the child as the fundamental principle of 
parent-child law and recognition of the rights of the child has imposed extremely important 
obligations on parents towards their children. 44 Moreover, whereas in the area of spousal law, 
modern law emphasizes the separateness of the partners, modern scholar, like Minow45, Haften46 
and Ronenn,47 claim that one of the basic rights of the child is the right to a relationship, with his 
parents and to the sense of belonging to a family. Beyond the writing of scholar, I should add that  
Articles 8-9 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, can be interpreted in that 
direction. .This right falls outside the narrow individualistic approach and requires the adoption 
of a relational attitude in the context of parent-child relations. The difference in individualistic 
trends between parent-child law and spousal law has been expressed in the use of the rights 
dialogue. Whereas in the context of spousal relations, the rights dialogue characterizes the 
symmetric relations of the couple, there is a lack of symmetry in the use of this dialogue in the 
context of parent-child relations. On one hand, in so far as concerns child-parent relations in 
many cases modern law equips the children with legal rights against their parents, on the other 
hand, in so far as concerns parent-child relations, many western systems of law have adopted the 
term “parental responsibilities” as the term suitable for the legal connection between parents and 
their children. 48 Even though in some countries49 the term “parental responsibilities” also 
 
43 See supra notes 31-34. 
44 In the 1990s the need to fulfil the economic obligation of parents (especially fathers) toward their children 
lead to legislation aimed at defining and enforcing the father’s duties. See, for example, in England, the Child 
Support Act 1991 (England); John M. Eekelaar, “Third Thoughts on Child Support”, 24 FAM. L. 99 (1994); in 
Canada, see, Laura W. Morgan, “Child Support and the Anomalous Cases of the High-Income and Low-Income 
Parent: The Need to Reconsider What Constitutes ‘Support’ in the American and Canadian Child Support Guideline 
Models”, 13 CAN. J. FAM. L. 161 (1996); in Australia, Stephen Parker, “The Australian Child Support Scheme”, 
20 FAM. L. 210 (1990) and in the United States, see Family Support Act 1988, Pub L. No 100-485 102 Stat. 2343 
42 U.S.C. s 667 (b); Marsha Garrison, “Child Support Policy: Guidelines and Goals”, 33 FAM L. Q. 157 (1999) and 
Grace G. Blumberg, “Balancing the Interests: The American Law Institute’s Treatment of Child Support”, 33 FAM. 
L. Q. 39 (1999). 
45 See Martha  Minow, “Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children’s Rights” 9 HARVARD 
WOMEN’S L. J. (1986) 1 
46 See  Bruce C. Hafen, “Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging”, 1991 BYU. L. 
REV. 1. 
47 See Ronen, supra note 41, 
48 The term “parental responsibility” was adopted in many jurisdictions, see, for example, the Children Act 
1989 (England); and the Children Act 1981. The transition from parent’s rights to parent’s responsibilities is 
prominent in the Scottish law of 1995, see Children (Scotland) Act 1995, Ch.36. In Israel, this is one of the central 
recommendations of the committee examining basic principles in the area of children and the law, and their 
implementation in legislation. See the report of the sub-committee of the Committee on the Child and His Family 
(Ministry of Justice Press, 2003). 
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includes certain parental rights50 (principally vis-à-vis the State), as a rule the term in fact 
emphasizes the commitments of the parents towards their children and their best interest.51 
ii) Public Regulation Versus Freedom of Contract  
 
Another difference between the modern trends in spousal law and parent-child law is connected 
to the tension between private ordering and public regulation.  
 
Until recently, the family relationship was dominated by massive public regulation. The State 
rather than the parties decided the legal content of the relationship and freedom of contract was 
not recognized.52 In contrast to traditional regulation, prominent researchers in the field of 
family law have now identified processes of deregulation and privatization53 occurring in modern 
western spousal law. The modern law has extended the freedom of contract of the spouse to 
regulate his spousal relationship and, in general, the law now prefers private ordering to public 
regulation.54 Indeed, according to some opinions, modern legislators should shape spousal law 
in the light of contractual values55 (e.g. fulfilment of the explicit and implicit will of the parties) 
so that in the long run contract law will replace family law.56 
In contrast to trends favouring privatization and freedom of contract characterizing spousal law, 
it is very difficult to characterize parent-child laws in a similar way. On the contrary, whereas 
entry into a spousal relationship is based on the consent of the parties and their free will, a person 
may have to undertake the commitments of a parent even when he did not desire the child. 57 
Accordingly, contrary to the trend seeking to structure spousal law on the basis of the assumed 
intentions of the parties, in the area of parent-child relations, the commitment of the parents to 
act in the best interest of the child is of a coercive character, and is not intended to reflect the 
 
49 The terminology of parents’ rights has not yet been completely negated. See, for example, Articles 5 and 18 
of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Indeed, the definition of responsibility in English law 
also includes the rights of the parents.  
50 For a critical discussion of the concept of parental rights, see Phillip Montague, “The Myth of Parental 
Rights” 26 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE (2000) 47, for support of this concept, see P. Shifam, FAMILY 
LAW (1989) 217 (Hebrew).    
51 See, for example, Article 30 of the Norwegian Child Law. See also M. Mavis and J. Eekelaar, THE 
PARENTAL OBLIGATION (1997). See also Freeman, supra note 38. 
52 See Part II. 
53 J.B. Singer, supra note 29; V. Pocar & P. Ronfani, “From Institution to Self-Regulation”, THE 
EUROPEAN FAMILY (Dordrecht, J. Commaille & F. de Singly eds., 1997) 195, 196; Garrison, “Marriage: The 
Status of Contract” 131 U. PA. L. REV. (1983) 1039, 1049. 
54 See principally, L. Alexander & P. Horton, “Freedom of Contract and the Family: A Skeptical Appraisal”, 
THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND THE STATE (San Francisco, J.R. Peden & F.R. Glahe eds., 1986) 229, 230–
236; M.A. Glendon, “The Withering Away of Marriage” 62 VA. L. REV. (1976) 663; Singer, ibid; V. Pocar & P. 
Ronfani, ibid, at 196; Garrison, “Marriage: The Status of Contract” 131 U. PA. L. REV. (1983) 1039, 1049. For 
criticism on this move, see Marica Neave, “Private Ordering in Family Law: Will Women Benefit? in PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES (Oxford, ed. Margaret Thornton, 1995) 145, 146.   
55 See David L. Chambers, “The ‘Legalization’ of the Family: Toward a Policy of Supportive Neutrality”, 18 
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 805 (1985). 
56 See Martha L. Fineman, “Contract Marriage and Background Rules”, ANALYZING LAW - NEW 
ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 183 (Brian Bix ed., 1998). 
57 See Pinhas Shifman, “Involuntary Parenthood: Misrepresentation as to the Use of Contraceptives” 4 INT. J. 
OF LAW AND FAMILY (1990) 279. 
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desire or the assumed consent of the parents. 58  Likewise, contrary to freedom of contract which 
is at the core of the modern model of spousal law, the minority of the children, the interest in 
ensuring their welfare, and the character of parent-child relations generally, 59 make it very 
difficult to contractually regulate the relations between parents and their children, without public 
oversight. 
 
iii) The Right to Exit 
 
The discrepancy between the trends in spousal law and parent-child law becomes dramatic in the 
context of ending the relationship. 
 
As we have seen the liberal-individualistic “right to exit” dominates spousal law. Consequently, 
not only does spousal law enable both parents to agree on ending the relationship but it also 
enables unilateral divorce.60 In contrast, in spite of the fact that in some circumstance the law 
enables children to obtain a “divorce” from their parents it is clear that parents cannot obtain a 
divorce from their children.61 Furthermore,  despite the fact that the can't enforce  parents to love 
their children or to be a good parents by specific performance order, In  the modern law there are 
sever legal result to extremely bad parenthood62.
A similar distinction between spousal law and parent-child law arises in connection with the 
regulation of the economic relations between members of the family following divorce. In the 
context of spousal law we have seen that whereas in the past the obligation to pay alimony 
prevented the absolute severance of the mutual economic responsibilities of the parties even in 
the case of divorce, modern divorce laws have weakened this obligation. We have explained that 
this aspect of divorce laws is connected to the ideology of a “clean break” at the core of which 
lies the desire to enable an absolute severing of the economic bond so as to allow the couple to 
begin a new life. 63 The situation is different in as far as concerns the economic commitment of 
parents towards their children. Indeed, in the past, as part of the ideology supporting a clean 
break and the need of divorced parents to begin a fresh life, an express or implicit trend 
 
58 For a philosophical discussion clarifying why the duties of parents toward their children cannot be justified 
by conventional contractual justifications, see John Eekelaar, “Parental Responsibility: State of Nature or Nature of 
the State? 1991 J. SOCIAL WELFARE & FAMILY LAW 37; see also Will Kymlicka, “Rethinking the Family” 20 
PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS (1991) 77; Pinhas Shifman, “Involuntary Parenthood: Misrepresentation 
as to the Use of Contraceptives” 4 INT. J. OF LAW AND FAMILY (1990) 279. 
59 With regard to the issue of contractual regulation, certain tensions may arise between approaches focusing 
on the best interests of the child, which may even be willing to protect paternalistically what is perceived to be the 
best interest of the child, and some of the approaches dealing with the rights of children which emphasize the 
autonomy of children and the need to enable them to participate and actively decide on matters that impact their 
lives, see, for example, Gerison Landsdown, TAKING PART – CHILDREN’S PARTICIPATION IN DECISION 
MAKING (London, 1995). At the same time, I believe that even those approaches which focus on the rights of 
children will not support the establishment of parent-child relations completely on contractual relations. 
60 See supra notes 31-33. 
61 For the legal implications of the abandonment of children, see, for example, Ana. L. Partida, “The case for 
the ‘safe haven’ laws: choosing the lesser of two evils in a disposable society”, 28. N.E.J. ON CRIM & CIV. CON.
(2002) 61, (the author discusses State enactments regarding the abandonment of children). .  
62 See  ibid, See also in Israel, Civil Appeal 2034/98 Amin v. Amin, 53(5) P.D. 69.  
 
63 See supra note 34. 
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developed supporting the weakening of the duty of maintenance of parents (in particular fathers 
towards their children). 64 However, this trend has been reversed, and today as part of the 
commitment towards the dual principles of the best interest and the rights of the child, many 
countries invest considerable effort in expanding and enforcing the duty of maintenance of 
parents towards their children. 65 In this sense, parent-child law is an exception to the regular 
liberal commitment to freedom to sever relations and obligations and the desire of modern family 
law to create convenient conditions for a new start in life. 
 
C.  From Partners to Parents  
From the analysis of the developments which took place in the second half of the 20th century it 
clearly follows that a fundamental shift has taken place in family law from regulation focusing 
on the spousal relationship to regulation focusing on parental relationships.  
 
In the spousal area, it is possible to discern a weakening of the legal commitment imposed on a 
person by reason of his spousal relations, to the extent that the law enables partners to initiate 
and achieve unilateral severance. In a similar context, the law prefers private ordering over 
public regulation. On a more general level, the legal importance of the spousal pattern in which a 
person lives been weakened, as many rights and many rights granted in the past solely to married 
persons, are today also granted to cohabitees and even to families which are not based on spousal 
relations (for example one-parent families). 66 In contrast, while parent-child relations have also 
undergone an individualistic process which emphasizes the autonomy of children, this process 
has not led to the weakening of parental responsibilities towards children and/or to a lessening of 
the public legal regulation of parent-child relations. On the contrary, in this area it is possible to 
discern an expansion of parental responsibility to realize the rights of their children, the freedom 
of parents to engage in contractual arrangements is still limited and certainly the law does not 
recognize the possibility of a parent unilaterally severing his connection to his child. Moreover, 
contrary to the past, modern law defines the parental connection, including responsibility, rights 
and the ensuing obligations, on the basis of the connection between the parent and child without 
reference to the spousal pattern in which the parents lived.67 
Thus, contrary to the weakening of the importance of the spousal relationship, modern law 
attaches huge importance to the connection between a parent and his child. Accordingly, there is 
massive legal regulation of parent-child relations. At the heart of this regulation lie the best 
interest of the child and the realization of his rights. Against this background there are those who 
see the shift from partners to parents as a process characterizing modern family law. 68 
64 See David L. Chambers, “The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support”, 80 MICH. L. REV.
1614 (1982). 
65 See supra note 44. 
66 See Nancy E. Dowd, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES (1997). 
67 See Martha A. Fineman, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). 
This is the main thesis of June Carbone, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS -  THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN 
FAMILY LAW (2000).     
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D. The Need to Distinguish Between Spousal Law and Joint Parent's Law 
 
Some radical feminists attack the traditional stance that describes both parents and children as 
the basic unit of the family. They think that the law must focus on what they call the dyad 
relationship between children and their primary caretakers (in most cases mothers).69 However, 
most law makers still think that even in cases in which the parents live separately the non–
custodian parent has an important role, authority and responsibility towards his child. 
Consequently, in cases in which there are problems in the relationship of the parents, for 
example, when they are not living together, parent-child law – beyond regulating children-parent 
relationships – will deal also with the mutual relationship between the parents themselves (called 
here - joint parents law)70.
These aspects of parenthood law challenge the current   direction of spousal law. On one hand, 
the aspiration of spousal law is to afford the spouses the opportunity to manage their life and 
their separation, by private ordering, and consequently the courts are expected to respect the 
freedom of contract of the spouses. On the other hand, the public character of parenthood law 
means that the court must supervise the parents’ agreement in the light of their responsibilities 
towards their child and in accordance with the “best interest” principle. The exit question also 
raises another tension. On one hand, it is the aspiration of spousal law to enable each spouse to 
end completely his legal relationship and obligations upon divorce (the clean break principle). 
On the other hand, the continued responsibility of both parents toward their children means that 
the economic and personal ties between the parents cannot be severed on divorce. 
 
What is the solution for the tension between the desire of spousal law to deregulate spousal 
relations and enable them to sever their ties completely following divorce and the need of parent-
child law to supervise the joint parenthood of ex-spouses, including restricting their ability to 
perform such a clean break? It would seem that the answer may be found in the question itself. 
 
Modern law must draw a clear and unequivocal distinction between the parental and spousal 
dimensions of the parties’ relations. In so far as concerns the spousal dimension of the relations, 
it is necessary to continue pursuing the individualistic contractual trends. In contrast, in so far as 
concerns the parental dimension of the parties’ relations it would be right to restrict these trends 
in accordance with considerations relating to the best interests of the child. Thus, whereas the 
common ethos which characterized the traditional regulation of parent-child law and spousal law 
enabled a coherent regulation of the relations of spouses who were parents, the tension between 
the trends in the two spheres of modern law require a sharp distinction to be drawn between 
regulation of the spousal dimension of parent relations and regulation of their joint parenthood. 
According to this view, in contrast to the past where the spousal conduct and the spousal pattern 
of the parents influenced the regulation of their parenthood, today regulation of parenthood, 
including regulation of joint parenthood, is an independent matter which is not contingent upon 
the conduct of the spouses or the spousal pattern in which they lived. 71 
69 See Fineman, supra note 67. 
70 See Part I below. 
71 For a similar process of thought, see Carbone, supra note 68 and June Carbone, “Income Sharing: 
Redefining the Family in Terms of Community”, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 359 (1994).  See also C.J. Frantz & H. Dagan, 
“Properties of Marriage” 104 COLUM. L. REV.(2004) 75, where the authors seek to present a theory of spousal 
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From the point of view of the best interest of the child, great importance attaches to the modern 
distinction between parenthood law and spousal law and the derivative distinction between the 
spousal aspect of the parties’ relationship and the regulation of their joint parenthood. 
 
First, the traditional approach which defined legal parenthood according to the spousal pattern of 
the parents was shaped in a sociological context in which, in the vast majority of cases, children 
were born and raised within wedlock. In contrast, today, many children are born and raised 
outside marriage and occasionally even without the parents being in a firm relationship.72 
Accordingly, in the modern world, the significance of a legal rule which defines parenthood in 
accordance with the nature of the relationship between the spouses may lead to the rescission of 
legal recognition of the relationship between many fathers and their children.73 Such a move 
would mean absence of recognition of these fathers’ parental responsibility towards their 
children. Releasing fathers from their duties towards their children may harm the children 
financially and emotionally.74 In this context there is a clear rationale for the modern approach 
which defines the parental bond, including responsibilities, rights and duties derived from it, on 
the basis of the connection between the parent and child without regard for the spousal pattern of 
the parents.75 
Second, the division between regulation of parenthood and regulation of partnerships protects 
children in that it clarifies to the lawmakers that the individualistic – private attitude to spousal 
relations is not applicable to joint parenthood. Hence, arrangements between parents on parental 
matters continue to be subject to public oversight which focuses on the best interest of the 
child.76 Similarly, the division between regulation of partnerships and regulation of parenthood 
promotes the best interest of children in that it clarifies that the modern aspiration to sever the 
 
relations which are detached from joint parental relations. Note, however, that Frantz & Dagan’s theory regarding 
partnership has clear joint communitarian aspects which differ from individualistic contractual trends characteristic 
of modern spousal laws.  
72 See, for example, Harry Willekens, “supra note 15, 53 ; Colin Gibson, “Contemporary Divorce and 
Changing Family Patterns”, DIVORCE - WHERE NEXT?, 9 (Michael D. A. Freeman ed., 1996); Arland Thornton, 
“Comparative and Historical Perspectives on Marriage, Divorce, and Family Life”, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 587. 
73 For the status of the father outside marriage, see Eekelaar - Welfarism, supra note 14, 319. See also the 
famous case of Michael H. et al. v. Gerald D., Supreme Court of the United States 491 U.S. 110. 
74 Indeed this was the legal situation in legal systems or religions where children born outside marriage were 
not regarded as the legal children of their father, see, for example, the decision of the Sharia court which formed the 
basis of the of the famous judgment of the Supreme Court in Israel in C.A. 3077/90 Platit v. Plati, 49(2) P.D. 578 
(in that case, the Sharia court denied the right of a girl born outside wedlock to maintenance payments from her 
father, as she was not regarded as his child according to Muslim law). 
75 See the judgment of the Supreme Court in that case. The court held that even if there was no right to 
maintenance by virtue of Muslim law, an obligation to pay ‘civil’ maintenance existed by virtue of the civil 
perception of a biological father as a father irrespective of the spousal pattern of the parents. 
76 For the validity of separation agreements which deal with custody issues, see recently, the articles 
contained in Family law Quarterly (2006).  
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relations between divorced spouses is inapplicable on the parental level. Moreover, legal rules in 
general, and family law rules in particular, influence social norms and consequently the behavior 
and even the preferences of people.77 Consequently, I believe that the distinction between 
partnerships and parenthood contributes to the spouses’ understanding that spousal crises and 
divorce cannot terminate their continued joint parental responsibilities.78 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding that the modern changes in family law support the importance of 
the distinction between the regulation of partnerships and regulation of parenthood, in this 
chapter I wish to argue that this distinction and its ramifications ought to be reconsidered. My 
fundamental contention is that occasionally the distinction between spousal behavior and 
parental behavior is artificial as in many cases spousal behavior has dramatic repercussions for 
the lives of children. I shall also argue that even in the legal context there is great difficulty in 
defining the boundaries between spousal laws and parental laws, as laws which are usually 
classified as spousal laws may have an influence on the interests and rights of children. 
Accordingly, confining the influence of the principle of the best interest of the child to what is 
classified today as parent-child law may cause great hardship from the point of view of the best 
interest of the child. In view of this approach, I shall propose the adoption of a normative regime 
which sees the best interest of the child as the guiding principle not only of parent-child laws but 
also of what is classified as spousal laws. I shall consider the need to identify new balancing 
formulae between the best interest of the child and the needs of the parents in areas dealt with by 
this study. I shall illustrate the possible application of the proposed approach in a number of 
important issues dealt with by family law. 
 
B. The Challenge: The Need of Modern Individual Spousal law to Consider 
the Best Interest of the Child   
 
Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides as follows: 
 
“1.  In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
(My emphasis – S.L.) 
 
As mentioned earlier, spousal laws deal with the regulation of partnerships and therefore they 
focus on spousal behaviour. In contrast, parent-child law deals with the regulation of relations 
between parents and children and therefore it focuses on parental conduct. Conceivably, it is 
because of this that the principle of the best interest of the child is perceived as the guiding 
principle of parent-child law even though its influence on spousal law is minimal. 
 
77 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, “On the Expressive Function of Law”, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 
(1996); Carol Weisbrod, “On the Expressive Function of Family Law”, 22 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 991 (1989). 
78 But see Milton C. Regan, “The Boundaries of Care: Constructing Community after Divorce”, 31 HOUS. L. 
REV. 425 (1994). Regan thinks that, in the long run, if one exposes the family to private–individualistic values, it 
will not be possible to identify community feelings in relation to the parent-child relationship. 
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Nonetheless, as will be explained in more detail below, in real life situations, in contrast to legal 
theory, the distinction between spousal behaviour and parental behaviour is not an easy one to 
make as “spousal” conduct has an apparent impact on the lives of children. Accordingly, legal 
regulation of spousal relations which focuses on the spouses and their conduct but which fails to 
take into account the best interest of their children may ultimately harm the children. 
 
Despite this, in legal discourse, it is customary to deal with the principle of the best interest of 
the child and its significance primarily in the traditional contexts of parent-child laws such as 
issues of custody, medical treatment, adoption, education, fostering and the like, albeit this 
restriction does not arise from the language of the convention or from its rationale.79 On the 
contrary, the article emphasizes that in “all actions concerning children” the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration. Under the convention, the best interest of the child is a 
primary consideration in the legal regulation of these matters. 
 
At the same time, while in relation to decisions which patently deal with children such as 
custody or education, it is possible to justify an approach making the best interest of the child a 
primary consideration and in certain circumstances even a paramount consideration which 
overrides other considerations including the interests and desires of the parents, it seems to me 
that even the most fervent supporters of the principle of the best interest of the child would find it 
difficult to justify the complete discounting of the desires and rights of the parents in relation to 
manifestly spousal matters such as the continuation of the partnership or division of property 
accumulated during the marriage. Thus, in relation to the latter issues, I do not believe that it is 
possible to attribute to the principle of the best interest of the child a status similar to that given 
to this principle in relation to issues dealing directly with children. At the same time, in view of 
the analysis which refers to the ramifications of spousal behaviour on the lives of children, the 
regulation of spousal relations which has an impact on children’s lives must take into account 
considerations of the best interest of the child concurrently with other customary considerations. 
At least in some cases, considerations of the best interest of the child and the obligations to 
children deriving from these considerations may clash with the contractual, private 
individualistic approach which currently characterizes spousal laws. 
 
Thus, the recognition of the far-reaching influence which spousal behaviour has for the legal 
regulation of the best interests of the child creates a difficult challenge for jurists committed to 
liberal-contractual-individualistic trends of spousal law, on one hand, and for the status of the 
best interest of the child as a supra-principle, on the other hand. I am not convinced that in this 
study I can propose a general comprehensive formula for the integration of considerations 
relating to the best interest of the child within the framework of spousal laws. Nonetheless, 
below, I shall still propose a number of ways in which such considerations may be integrated in 
spousal laws in relation to a number of specific issues usually dealt with by these laws (divorce 
laws, property relations, accommodation laws and attitudes towards spousal agreements). As we 
shall see, a cautious analysis of considerations relating to the best interest of the child on one 
hand and the interests and desires of the parents on the other hand, shows that at least in some of 
the cases it is possible to propose acceptable balancing mechanisms between the interests and 
 
79 See also Yair Ronen, THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD TOWARD CROSS CULTURAL 
CONCEPTION (PhD thesis 1999). 
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desires of the parents and the needs and welfare of the children. Applying the balancing formula 
proposed here, we shall examine some of the regulations used in the legal systems of various 
countries and in some of the cases we shall propose interpretations of these regulations combined 
with the principle of the best interest of the child. In other cases we shall conclude that it is 
necessary to amend the existing law. 
 
C. The Normative Implication  
i Divorce on Demand and Child Considerations  
 
Divorce laws expressively illustrate the modern trend towards distinguishing between spousal 
laws and parental laws and the decreasing importance of child considerations in the modern 
understanding of partnership and its laws. 
 
In the past, the legal and moral expectations of society were that spouses would overcome 
differences of opinions and refrain from divorce ‘for the sake of the children’. 
 
This expectation faltered in the second half of the 20th century when the legal attitude towards 
divorce was primarily spousal. It was argued that while the divorce of parents indeed severed a 
considerable portion of the bond and the legal responsibilities between the parents it did not 
sever the legal bond and responsibilities between the parents and their children80.Thus, in the 
spirit of the general distinction between spousal laws and parental laws, a distinction developed 
between the divorce itself – which concerned the relations between the parents – and some of the 
consequences of the divorce, for example, custody of children and maintenance of children, 
which were concerned with the continued responsibility of parents for their children. This spirit 
of individualism which guided the spousal laws shaped the divorce laws; the resulting trend was 
the dramatic facilitation of the spouses or even one of them to initiate a divorce to the extent that 
some observers described the model of divorce on demand as the dominant model in the modern 
approach towards divorce laws.  In view of the primacy given to the desire of the couple (or one 
of them) to divorce, almost no weight at all was given to considerations relating to the best 
interest of the child. In practice, even the most fervent supporters of the principle of the best 
interest of the child explained that this principle was not to be given primacy when divorce laws, 
in their narrow sense, were being deliberated.81 
In recent times the status of children affected by divorce disputes has become the subject of 
renewed discussion.82 This fresh interest is linked to a series of studies which exposed the long 
 
80 See ,, supra note 9 “Although divorce legally ends a marriage, it cannot dissolve the bond uniting father – 
or mother –  and child”. 
81 See Van Bern, ibid, at p. 48 et seq. . See also Ronen, supra note 41 at 274. 
82 See, for example, E. M. Hetherington &  M. Stanley-Hagan (1999), “The Adjustment of Children with 
Divorced Parents: A Risk and Resilience Perspective”, JOURNAL OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND 
PSYCHIATRY AND ALLIED DISCIPLINES, 40 (1), 129-140; P. R. Amato (2000), “The Consequences of 
Divorce for Adults and Children”, JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY, 62 (4) 1269-1288; E. M. 
Hetherington & J. Kelly (2002), FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED, New York: 
Norton; A. Booth, & P. R. Amato (2001), “Parental Divorce Relations and Offspring - Post Divorce Well-Being”, 
JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY,63,197-212; J. S. Wallerstein, S. Blakeslee & J. Lewis, (2002) 
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term damage caused to children of divorced parents83 and to children in one-parent families in 
general.84 The studies showed that children raised under the shadow of divorce are more likely to 
suffer from emotional distress, learning difficulties, premature departure from school, early 
pregnancy, juvenile crime and future unemployment and relationship problems. In view of these 
findings, new opponent of the modern model of divorce on demand claim that divorce law must 
be shaped in such a way as to enable the prevention or at least significant postponement of 
divorce in order to protect the interests of minor children.85 
Prima facie, the analysis exposing the serious problems encountered by children of divorced 
parents presents an irreconcilable contradiction between considerations of the welfare of the 
child which support making divorce laws more strict and the liberal-individualist ideology which 
supports a sharp and clean break. Yet, in my view, a deeper examination of this issue reveals that 
the contradiction is not as acute as might seem at first glance and that even considerations of the 
welfare of the child do not necessarily support a policy of strict divorce laws. 
 
First, the argument that it is necessary to make divorce laws more stringent because of the 
suffering of children of divorced parents, tacitly assumes that stringent divorce laws are likely to 
prevent divorces. However, such an argument itself is a matter of intense controversy as many 
studies doubt the capacity of divorce laws to reduce the rate of divorces.86 
THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: THE 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY. New York: Hyperion.; C. 
P. Martinez & M. S. Forgatch (2002), “Adjusting to Change: Linking Family Structure Transitions with Parenting 
and Boys Adjustment”, JOURNAL OF FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY, 16 (2) 107-117; M. F. Whiteside & B. S. Becker 
(2000), “Parental Factors and the Young Child’s Post Divorce Adjustment: A Meta-Analysis with Implications for 
Parenting Arrangements”, JOURNAL OF FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY 14 (1), 5-26; L. Laumann-Billings & , R.E. 
Emery (2000), “Distress Among Young Adults from Divorced Families”, JOURNAL OF FAMILY 
PSYCHOLOGY, 14 (4), 671-687. 
83 See J. S. Wallerstein  & J. B. Kelly, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP - HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS 
COPE WITH DIVORCE (New York, 1980);  J. S. Wallerstein &  S. Blakeslee, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE, (New-York, 1989); R. E. Emery, MARRIAGE 
DIVORCE AND CHILDREN’S AJUSTMENT (Newbury Park, Cali. 1988); P. R. Amato, “Children’s Adjustment 
to Divorce: Theories, Hypotheses and Empirical Support”, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. (1993) 23; P.R. Amato & A. 
Booth, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL (Cambridge, 1997). 
84 See S. McLanahan & G. Sandefur, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS WHAT 
HELPS (Harvard, 1994); see also L. J. Waite & M. Gallagher, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED 
PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER AND BETTER OF FINANCIALLY (New-York, 2000). 
85 For attacks on divorce laws because of their influence on children and the demand that divorce laws be 
made more stringent as a result, see, for example, D.S. Vivaz, “Balancing Children’s Rights into the Divorce 
Decision”, 13 VT. L. REV. (1989) 531; J.T. Younger, “Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and 
Demoralization Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform”, 67 CORNELL L. REV. (1981) 45, 90 et seq.; 
Waite & Gallagher, ibid, at Ch. 9-10, 14; Wardle, supra note 30 at 134;  W. Galston, LIBERAL PURPOSE: 
GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (Cambridge, 1991) 286-287; K.S. Spaht, “For 
the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage”, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (1998) 1547. 
86 In recent years, numerous studies have examined this question, see, for example, Martin Zelder, “The 
Economic Analysis of the Effect of No-Fault Divorce Law on the Divorce Rate”, 16 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
(1993) 241; Ira M. Ellman & Sharon Lohr, “Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence and Other Bad 
Arguments for Fault Divorce”, 1997 U.  Ill. L. Rev. 719; T. B. Marvell, “Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement“, 
23 L. & SOC. REV. (1989) 543. See also P. A. Nakonezny et al., “The Effect of No-Fault Divorce Law on Divorce 
Rate Across the 50 States and its Relation to Income, Education, and Religiosity”, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
(1995) 477; D. W. Allen, “Marriage and Divorce: Comment”, 82 AM. ECON. REV. (1992) 679; L.  Friedberg, “Did 
Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data”, 88 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 
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Second, even if divorce laws are capable of reducing the legal divorce rate, it is not clear that 
strict divorce laws can contend with the sociological phenomenon of divorce, i.e., the separation 
of the couple. Many of the problems faced by the children of divorced couples are connected to 
the sociological aspect of the divorce and not necessarily to the legal aspect. Accordingly, it is 
not clear that a change to the legal regulation would contribute to the welfare of the children. 
 
Third, the harsh findings regarding the special problems of children in families which have 
undergone divorce do not necessarily prove that it was the divorce (in its legal and/or 
sociological sense) per se which harmed the children. An alternative possibility is certainly 
conceivable, namely, that it is the processes which generally accompany a dispute between 
parents, and in particular life in homes characterized by harsh disputes87 between the parents, 
which cause the difficulties.88 If this is the case, the proposal to make divorce laws more 
stringent will not help these children, but on the contrary, will harm them. Lengthening the 
divorce process may increase the exposure of the children to tensions between their parents in 
the period when these tensions are in fact at their most acute. Accordingly, making divorce laws 
more stringent may worsen the problems faced by the children of parents desiring to divorce.89 
It should also be emphasized that at least some of those criticizing modern divorce laws attempt 
to deal with the assumption that the cause of the distress to children in cases of divorce is not the 
divorce itself but the conflict between the couple prior to divorce. For this purpose, new 
psychological studies are presented that use complex statistical tools which isolate the influences 
of different factors.90 These studies prove that at least in certain cases (for example, homes 
characterized by low levels of tension) some of the problems faced by children of divorced 
parents are attributable to the divorce itself and not ancillary processes.91 On the face of it, 
therefore, an approach focusing on the welfare of the child would support negating the 
 
(1998) 608. Notwithstanding the intensive research, the studies have found it difficult to reach a consensus on this 
issue. 
87 For the impact of conflicts between parents (prior and post divorce) on children’s adjustment, see K. A. 
Camara & G. Resnick, “Interpersonal Conflict and Cooperation: Factors Moderating Children’s Post-Divorce 
Adjustment”, in IMPACT OF DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING AND STEPPARENTING ON CHILDREN, 
(Hillsdale, E. M.  Hetherington & J. D. Arasteh eds., 1988) 169. See also the review set out in J. H. Grych & F. D. 
Fincham, “Marital Conflict and Children’s Adjustment: A Cognitive-Contextual Framework”, 108 
PSYCHOLOGICAL – BULLETIN (1990) 267. 
88 In this context see Amato, supra note 83, at 30-31. See also Lawrence A. Kurdek, “Issues in Proposing a 
General Model of the Effects of Divorce on Children”, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. (1993) 39, 40-41. 
For arguments in this spirit, see Robert W. Gordon, “The Limits of Limits on Divorce”, 107 Yale L. J. 1435 (1998). 
1448-1449. 
90 In recent years a whole branch of psychological research has developed, at the centre of which is an attempt 
to identify which components in the divorce process have the greatest impact on children. See, for example, Cherlin 
et al., “Longitudinal Studies of Effects of Divorce on Children in Great Britain and the United States”, 252 
SCIENCE 1386 (1991). See also McLanahan & Sandefur, supra note 84 (who try to develop a model which will 
define when divorce is the best option for children and when it is a harmful option). See further P. R. Amato & A. 
Booth, “A Prospective Study of Divorce and Parent-Child Relationships”, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. (1996) 356; 
Amato supra note 82; and recently Amato & Booth, supra note 83. See also the review of research appearing in 
Gordon, id.
91 For this, see the sources cited in the previous note (principally Amato & Booth, id., at 196-197, 204-205, 
and the studies discussed there). See also the sources cited in Spaht, supra note 85, at 1556-1558; Waite & 
Gallagher, supra note 84, at 145-147. 
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possibility of divorce in such cases. At the same time, in my view, legal rules which would 
define certain family situations (for example, low levels of tension between parents) as ones 
which negate the possibility of divorce, may encourage partners interested in divorce to act 
manipulatively and heighten the family conflict. Accordingly, such rules may ultimately harm 
children. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, legal rules will obstruct, or at the most delay, formal 
divorce; the ability of divorce laws to prevent substantive divorce, i.e. to prevent the possibility 
of separation and severance is much weaker. It seems that even the studies which conclude that 
divorces harm children, are addressing divorces in their sociological sense and not the legal 
definition of the relations between the parties. Accordingly, I do not believe that a 
comprehensive rescission of the right to legal divorce would be an efficient measure even from a 
perspective focusing on the welfare of the child. 
 
Earlier I explained why comprehensive denial of divorce is not an appropriate policy from a 
point of view focusing on the welfare of the child. At the same time, notwithstanding my 
reservations concerning comprehensive denial of the unilateral right to no-fault divorce, it would 
seem that the demand to take into account the welfare of children when shaping divorce laws is 
certainly valid. I believe that the studies which deal with the influence of divorces on children 
clearly show that even if divorces do not invariably harm children,92 the process is a complex 
one which has a significant impact on their lives. Accordingly, the manner in which divorces are 
conducted in specific cases may have far reaching effect on the lives of the couple’s children. It 
seems, therefore, that the best interest of the children must be one of the factors influencing the 
shape of divorce laws. Thus, even those who do not believe that a strict and all-embracing policy 
regarding achieving a divorce will inure to the benefit of the child, would agree that the divorce 
procedure ought to be shaped in a manner which takes into account the impact of the divorce on 
the children in the concrete case. Consequently, different treatment ought to be accorded to 
divorces which involve children and divorces which do not involve children. Where the divorces 
do not involve children, the divorces must focus on the parents, their desires and needs. In 
contrast, when the process involves a couple with children, a divorce procedure must be 
established which also takes into account the best interest of those children. This may have a 
number of practical legal ramifications which go beyond the prevailing legal order in most 
western countries:  
 
First, conceivably it is necessary to establish default options which distinguish between the 
length of a divorce process which does not involve children and the length of a divorce process 
which involves children. At least as a starting premise, it would seem that the existence of 
children is a consideration for establishing a lengthier divorce process both in order to exhaust 
the possibility of compromise between the parents and in order to enable the family to properly 
prepare and plan their divorce. 
 
Second, I believe that in the case of divorce which involves minors, it is right to enable the 
courts to make the divorce contingent upon a referral to professionals or to special  Unit which 
 
92 On the contrary, a close consideration of the studies dealing with the impact of divorce on children reveals 
a complex picture, where alongside cases where divorce harms children, primarily in families where the level of 
conflict is low, other cases arise (primarily where family relations are very tense) where the divorce facilitates the 
adjustment of children in problematic families. This is admitted even by those who support making divorce law 
more stringent. See, for example, Amato &  Booth, id., at 196-197, 204-205; and Gordon, supra note 89. 
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operates within the Family Court, which will enable the couple and the family as a whole to 
prepare and plan their future actions. Moreover, against the background of the significant 
ramifications of divorce upon children, we may ask the court dealing with children to obtain a 
report from a professional regarding the expected impact of the divorce process upon the 
children and even demand that the children or their independent representative be heard prior to 
the divorce.  
 
Finally, beyond the ordinary rules dealing with the divorce process, the court must be vested 
with the power to delay or propel forward the divorce process in a specific case, while taking 
into account the opinions of professionals and its evaluation of the needs of the couple’s 
children. 
 
In this context, I wish to re-emphasize that according to our analysis considerations relating to 
children cannot entirely prevent divorce or even defer them for a prolonged period of time. At 
the same time, considerations of the best interest of the child may make the concrete divorce 
process compatible with the needs of the children of the family. It seems to me that even if the 
price of such compatibility is certain harm to the right to exit of the person seeking the divorce, 
the modern ethos which is committed to the best interest of the child may justify such harm, 
provided always that such harm is temporary. 
 
Against the backdrop of my recommendations regarding the situation which ought to prevail, an 
examination of the actual legal situation is largely disappointing: 
 
On one hand, in many western countries, such as the countries of Scandinavia,93 Australia94 and 
some of the states in the United States,95 there is a clear tendency towards expressly or impliedly 
 
93 In most of the countries of Scandinavia, there is a pure ‘official’ system of ‘no-fault’ divorce on demand. 
At least in some of those countries agreed divorce is not a legal issue at all. For this, see Glendon, supra note 13 at 
182-188; Pocar & Ronfani, supra note 32 at 196-197; T.S. Schmidt, “The Scandinavian Law of Procedure in 
Matrimonial Causes”, THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT (Toronto, J.M. Eekelaar & S.N. Katz eds., 
1984) 77. 
94 Divorce on demand is also available in Australia. There, one year of separation allows a party to obtain a 
divorce unilaterally. See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (Australia) Section 48. 
95 The American approach is manifest in the Uniform Code - see Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 9A 
U.L.A. 147 (1987) – and the California code, which reflected the revolution. Both codes repealed the usual grounds 
of divorce, and divorce is available only upon irreversible breakdown of marriage. Prima facie, the legislative 
changes need not necessarily have led to divorce on demand, and even not to divorce by consent. Indeed, certain 
courts have emphasized the obligation of the court to carry out independent examination, and not confine themselves 
to the testimony of the parties. See, for example, the judgment in Ryan v. Ryan 277 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1973). In 
practice, the formal notes to the Code grant the courts power to deny a divorce when one party objects and argues 
that the marriage has not broken down. See H.H. Clark, “The Role of Court and Legislature in the Growth of Family 
Law” 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (1989) 699, 702; see also R. Levy, “A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage 
and Divorce Act - and Some Reflections About Its Critics and Its Policies”, BYU L. REV. (1991) 43, 45-46. At the 
same time, review of the vast legal literature which describes the divorce law, clarifies that despite the above 
theoretical possibility, in these countries an interested party may divorce even without the consent of his partner. 
Clark - H.H. Clark, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (Vol 2, St. Paul, 2nd ed., 
1987) 42 - stated this eloquently: “It is virtually impossible to imagine a case in which if one spouse wishes divorce 
the divorce would be denied”. However, it is important to note that contrary to the commonly held view whereby 
every state in the United States enables divorce on demand, a closer consideration of the divorce laws in New York, 
Mississippi and Tennessee shows that in these states, at least according to the ‘official’ law, it is not possible to 
26
adopting a special divorce model based on demand. As I have shown this model is not 
sufficiently sensitive to the needs of children. On the other hand, a large proportion of the 
proposals for reform of family law seek to make divorce laws in their entirety more stringent or 
even return to fault based models of divorce. First, a large proportion of these proposals ensue 
from moral and/or religious motivation regarding the institution of marriage and they do not 
focus on the best interest of the children. Second, even when the motivation of the persons 
making the proposals is the best interest of the children, I do not believe that making the divorce 
laws more stringent is the right solution. Indeed, as I fully explained previously, the best interest 
of children does not necessarily require the prevention of divorce and certainly it does not justify 
the discourse of fault.  
 
Against the background of my criticism both against the modern trend towards the model of 
divorce on demand and against the approaches which seek to make the divorce process as a 
whole more stringent for the sake of the welfare of the children, I wish to note favourably the 
Family Law Act which was adopted in England at the end of the last century.96 In certain aspects 
the new Act integrates with the previous trends towards easing the laws of divorce: the new Act 
completely repeals the grounds of fault, and the sole ground for divorce is a declaration by one or 
both parties that the marital connection has broken down.97 In other words, the system is one of 
“no fault” which enables “official” unilateral divorces. 
 
At the same time, the Act illustrates the legal possibility of taking into account the best interest 
of children: 
 
First, in the spirit of our recommendation, the Act distinguishes between a divorce in which 
minor children are involved and one in which children are not involved.98 
Second, the Act determines that all matters connected with the custody of children must be 
resolved prior to a divorce order being given.99 
divorce at all without the consent of the innocent party, and accordingly it is not possible to characterize these states 
as states which supply divorce on demand or even as states which enable unilateral divorce. 
96 Family Law Act 1996 (hereinafter: “the English Family Law Act”). For a detailed description of the 
provisions of the Act and the way in which they integrate with other statutes, see R.C. Bird & S. Cretney, 
DIVORCE: THE NEW LAW (Bristol, 1996); G. Douglas, “’Family Values’ to the Fore?” THE INTERNATIONAL 
SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 1996 (Hague, A. Bainham ed., 1998) 157; Cretney, Masson & Bailey-Harris, supra 
note 17 at 297 et seq.;  
97 Section 5 of the English Family Law Act,. 
98 According to the Act, the divorce process begins with an information meeting in which the parties are 
given explanations regarding the divorce process. About three months after the meeting, the interested party submits 
the application to divorce. The final divorce order is given about nine months after the application if no minors are 
involved, and fifteen months after the application if minors are involved (see Sections 2-8 of the English Family 
Law Act as well as the sources describing the Act, supra note 30. The Act anticipates that the parties will utilize the 
waiting period to reflect about the possibility of reconciliation or settle property issues if reconciliation is 
impossible. For a sceptical approach to this anticipation, see S. Cretney, “The Divorce White Paper - Some 
Reflections”, 25 FAM. L. (1995) 302.. At least during the running in period of the Act, in which it was being 
examined in relation to a small number of couples, the sceptical approach was found to be  realistic, as in most cases 
the couples came to meetings at a stage when it was already impossible to rehabilitate their relations.  
99 According to the Act, in the absence of an agreement or judgment relating to property or children, an order 
of divorce will not be given. See Sections 2 and 9 of the English Family Law Act,  
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Third, the Act empowers the court to prevent a divorce in the event that it would result in serious 
hardship to the children of the couple.100 
As noted, the premise of the Act is that a divorce process in which children are involved will last 
longer. At the same time, the Act is aware of cases where this is contra-indicated and therefore 
provides that when the best interest of the child compels a swift divorce process, it is possible to 
bring forward the time of divorce. 
 
It cannot be denied that part of the motivation for enacting the Act was connected to a 
fundamental trend towards strengthening the institution of marriage.101 In addition, in England 
doubt has been expressed regarding the ability to implement the Act in practice and indeed the 
implementation of the Act has been deferred for the time being, and according to a government 
announcement it is possible that it will be amended prior to being implemented.102 Nonetheless, I 
believe that this Act and the processes preceding it make it clear that western law has not yet said 
the last word on the laws of divorce and at least from the perspective of the best interest of the 
child it seems that this is a correct process. 
 
ii Property Relationship: the Rights of Children in the Family Property  
 
The economic relations between couples also illustrates the modern trend towards distinguishing 
between spousal relations and parenthood and joint parenthood and the difficulties posed by this 
distinction from a point of view which focuses on the best interest of the child. 
 
In the prevailing legal discourse, children’s maintenance is perceived as a child’s right, 
notwithstanding that in practice payment of maintenance is made to the parent and not directly to 
the child, it is perceived to be part of the laws of parenthood. In contrast, the duty to maintain a 
spouse and property rules are perceived to be part of spousal law. 
 
However, in the real world the distinction is less sharp: 
 
First, the non-custodial parent does not pay the financial support directly to the child but to the 
custodial parent and in practice besides the needs of the child the financial means of both parents 
are an important factor in the calculation of the precise sum that the non custodial parent has to 
pay. This means that the economic connection and even dependency between the spouses 
continue. The continuing ties and dependency dramatically weaken the clean break aspirations of 
spousal law.103 
More important is the fact that the economic relations between the couple are not entirely 
spousal in nature, as the economic state of the custodial parent has a dramatic influence on the 
 
100 See Section 10 of the English Family Law Act,  
101 See, for example, the statement in Section 1 of the Act. 
102 See Cretney, Masson & Bailey-Harris, supra note 17 at 308-309;  
103 Thus, in some circumstances, the clean-break ideology does influence the regulation of the responsibility of 
a parent toward his child. See, for example, Delany v. Delaney [1990] 2 FlR 457 (Ca).    
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interests of children and the quality of their lives.104 Thus, for example, studies show that 
notwithstanding the tendency of property law in the western world to share the joint property of 
the couple equally, in many cases female custodians encounter economic problems in the 
aftermath of divorce.105 In view of the fact that in the majority of divorce disputes it is the 
women who struggle as the custodians of the children, it is no wonder that studies show that the 
economic situation of the parent who holds the child following divorce, is one of the factors 
which has the greatest influence on the negative phenomena experienced by children of divorced 
families.106 
Naturally, the economic condition of the custodial parent derives not only from the sum he 
receives for child maintenance but also and perhaps primarily from the economic spousal 
regulation between the parties, i.e., the property relations and the obligation to pay maintenance 
to the other spouse. Consequently, the property arrangements and the economic support of the 
spouse which are customarily regarded in legal thinking as spousal issues, have clear influence 
on the welfare of children. Accordingly, I believe that expansion of the obligatory duty of the 
father to maintain his children cannot suffice, it would be right to consider a reform of the 
property laws aimed at safeguarding the economic and psychological state of the children of 
divorced families. 
 
Reforms of this type are likely to justify departing from an equal distribution of the property of 
the parties, in favour of the spouse holding the children in order to ensure the welfare of the 
children of the family. It is also possible to think of a more radical change which would allow 
some of the family property to be transferred into the names of the children or at least for a short 
period of time to charge some of the family property in favour of the children of the family. 
 
Contrary to the position I have espoused here, it seems that in recent years many western 
countries, including most of the states of the United States, have developed a different trend. 
Following this trend, even common law countries have tended to adopt the tradition of the 
countries of the civil law in which family property is perceived as a product of partnership 
between spouses. This perception tends to prefer a stringent partnership rule which divides the 
products  of the partners between the partners, i.e., between the spouses. This rule makes it much 
more difficult to depart from equal distribution generally and accordingly makes it more difficult 
to vest extra portions of the property in the custodial parent.107 Certainly, the attitude to a 
 
104 See K. A Clarke-Stewart, K. McCatney, D. L. Vandel, M. T. Owen, & C. Booth, (2000) Effects of Parental 
Separation and Divorce on Very Young Children”, JOURNAL OF FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY, 14 (2), 304-326; J. 
M. Hilton & S. Desrochers, “Children’s Behavior Problems in Single-Parent and Married-Parent Families: 
Development of a Predictive Model”, JOURNAL OF DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE (2002) 37 (1\2) 13-36. 
See for example Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution - The Unexpected Social and Economic 
Consequences. for Women and Children in America (1985). 
 
106 See, for example, McLanahan & Sandefur, supra note 83, Chapter 5. For a similar, albeit more reserved, 
view, see Amato, supra note 82 at 32-33. 
107 Thus, for example, in the United States, where in the past the majority of states supported equitable law, 
there is a clear trend in the direction of partnership. This trend is reflected in legislation which guides or even 
requires judges to prefer equal distribution and on occasion even in an independent policy of courts preferring equal 
distribution over other forms of distribution, see C. J. Frantz & H. Dagan, “Properties of Marriage” 104 
COLUMBIA L. REV (2004) 101, 126. Against this background, it is not surprising that the American Law 
Institution PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
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partnership in which the sole partners are the parents makes it difficult to directly vest property 
rights in the children of the family. 
 
Against the background of my criticism of legal systems which are committed to strict equal 
distribution, there is a clear advantage to equitable legal systems which enable the courts to 
depart from equal distribution for various reasons. Particularly noteworthy are legal systems 
which like the English Property law  refer to the best interest of children as a specific factor 
which dictates the economic consequences of the divorce.108 
In this regard I wish to emphasize that the legal literature reflects an intense dispute concerning 
the advantages and disadvantages of equitable legal systems versus legal systems favouring strict 
equal distribution.109 Indeed, in many cases equitable legal systems undermine legal stability.110 
Moreover, empirical studies show that in many cases, equitable legal systems have led to the 
diminution of the share of women in spousal property and not the opposite.111 Naturally, an 
inequitable distribution in which custodial women receive less than half of the spousal property 
harms children. In practice, even in England in which, as we have seen, the welfare of the child, 
is a formal criterion in terms of the division of property, a practice has developed in which 
women receive only a third of the spousal property. However, even if in the prevailing situation, 
equitable distribution harms women, in my opinion, it is possible to conceive of an additional 
reform which will relate to equal distribution as a stringent default option and which will enable 
a deviation from this type of division in favour of the custodial parent only, and only when this 
deviation is required for the benefit of the couple’s children. 
 
The possibility of vesting children with direct rights in the family property is even more 
problematic from the property point of view. Nonetheless, at least in some western states there 
are statutory provisions and judgments which vest this power. I believe that from the vantage 
point of the benefit of the child extensive use of these provisions should be encouraged.112 
So far I have referred to the need to integrate children related considerations into property law in 
those situations in which divorcing couples have minor children. Now I wish to argue that the 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) (hereinafter: the ALI) which recently completed an ambitious project restating 
family law, provides for equal distribution as the default option in Section 4.09 of the chapter dealing with property 
relations between spouses. For similar examples in Australia, see Rebbeca Bailey-Harris, “Equality or Inequality 
within the Family? Ideology, Reality and the Law’s Responses” in THE CHANGING FAMILY: FAMILY FORMS 
& FAMILY LAW (Oxford, John Eekelaar & Thandabantu Nhlapo eds, 1998) 251, 256-261. 
108 See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, Section 25(1) of which refers to the welfare of the child as the central 
criterion for determining the property relations between the spouses. According to the English Act as amended in 
1984 “In exercising the powers conferring by this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstance of the 
case first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the 
age of eighteen … .”. 
109 See Marsha Garrison, “How do Judges decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary 
Decision Making”, 74 N.C.L. REV. (1996) 401, 411-419. 
110 , for example, a lot of lawyers in  England, referring to the difficulty in identifying a unified legal policy. 
111 See Marsha Garrison, “How do Judges decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary 
Decision Making”, 74 N.C.L. REV. (1996) 401. 
112 See, for example, Dougherty v. Dougherty (1987) 163 CLR 278, in Australia which interprets Section 79(1) 
of the Family Law Act in a way that enables the court to consider the child’s interests in altering the property 
settlement between the parents. 
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original design of the property laws must also take into account the ramifications these laws have 
for the willingness of the couple to make decisions for the benefit of their children even when 
these decisions prima facie harm them personally. Thus, for example, property laws which do 
not take into account the loss of career of the domestic spouse may prevent couples from 
reducing their work hours in order to devote time to being with their children even when such a 
decision is needed for the benefit of the children. Against this background I believe that the 
considerations of the best interest of the child support establishing property arrangements which 
will enable the parties to live lifestyles which take into account the good and benefit of their 
children.113 Accordingly, I believe that considerations of the benefit of the child require the 
establishment of mechanisms which will compensate the spouse who took care of the children 
for his loss of career during the marriage and/or even vest him with a portion of the human 
capital which his spouse accumulated during the marriage. More precisely, in recent years there 
have been those who justified the establishment of such mechanisms and at least some have been 
adopted in various countries. Nonetheless, in the present discourse, the justification for these 
mechanisms is based on the relationship between the couple and on their interests. In contrast, in 
my opinion, beyond the regular spousal justifications it is also possible to justify these 
mechanisms from a broader public point of view which seeks to enable and encourage 
comfortable conditions for children to grow. Accordingly, it should be noted that ironically these 
type of child related considerations should be implemented even if, at the time of divorce, the 
children of the couple have already become adults, as property laws which do not care for a 
spouse who sacrificed his personal interests for his children is likely to cause hardship in the 
future to the children of other couples. 
 
Thus, in my opinion, a proper regulation of property law must distinguish between three separate 
situations: 
 
1. Couples without children – in such a case, the legal regulation will be based solely on the 
interests of the couple and accordingly in most cases the private individual ideology 
currently guiding spousal law will continue to be compatible. 
 
2. Couples with small children at the time of divorce – in this case, regulating the property 
relations must take into account the needs of the minor children. A matter which may 
justify both deviation from equal distribution in favour of the custodial parent and direct 
registration of the property in the names of the children. 
 
3. Couples who together raised children who have since become adult – in this case the 
legal regulation will focus on the couple. At the same time, the regulation must take into 
account the public interest in encouraging or at least in enabling parents to devote time to 
their children. Accordingly, beyond the regular considerations raised by the laws of 
property there is room to compensate the spouse who devoted most of his time to raising 
the children as their primary care-taker. 
 
113 Indeed, in recent years, modern spousal laws have begun to recognize the need to compensate the domestic 
spouse for loss of career during marriage, see Ellman supra note 17. At the same time, according to current thought, 
such recognition is perceived as primarily a spousal matter. In my opinion, however, this recognition does not deal 
exclusively with the spousal aspect of the parties’ relationship but also with the joint parental aspect. 
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In this connection it is important to admit that the recognition of property rights of children in 
family property is contrary to customary property thinking and in many senses it impairs the 
individual rights of the parents. At the same time, I believe that modern law recognizes, in 
numerous contexts, the economic and non-economic limitations which parental relations impose 
on the parent. Thus, for example, Article 27(2) of the Convention provides that: 
 
“The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to 
secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary 
for the child’s development.” 
 
Accordingly, I am of the opinion that in certain cases it is also right to protect the rights of 
children using property or quasi-property measures and that the accepted distinction between the 
obligatory right of children to maintenance and property relations which deal with property 
issues, is not sacred. In any event, it is clear to me that the issue of property relations again 
illustrates the need to find new balancing formulae between the needs of children and the rights 
of parents, an issue which will be discussed in the last paragraph of this section. 
 
iii   Accommodation  
 
The difficulty alluded to in the previous section, concerning the division of the economic 
relations between those attributable to the spousal relations and those relating to the interests of 
the children, manifest itself in the context of the family living accommodation. On one hand, on 
the property level, in the vast majority of cases the residential home is the property of both 
spouses or a single spouse. Accordingly, this is apparently a spousal issue. However, the 
definition of ownership of the residential home, and even more so decisions regarding severing 
the partnership in the apartment by selling it, may have dramatic ramifications for the lives of 
their children, who concurrently with the divorce will also be forced to relinquish a familiar 
place of residence. Indeed, psychological studies of divorce show that one of the ramifications of 
divorce is the harm to the sense of stability of the children of the couple. Part of the impairment 
to stability is connected to the family change within the framework of which daily contact with 
the two parents is terminated. An additional aspect of instability is connected to the fact that in 
many cases, one of the ramifications of divorce is a change in the place of residence as a result of 
the sale of the residence pursuant to the distribution of assets between the parents.114 
Accordingly, notwithstanding the natural classification of the issue as a spousal matter, one 
cannot ignore its ramifications for the quality of life of the children. 
 
Does the existing legal situation enable the prevention of the sale and distribution of the 
residential home in order to ensure stability in the lives of the children? 
 
According to standard legal thinking, the parent’s obligation to provide economic support for his 
children naturally includes the need to ensure their accommodation. This obligation is commonly 
perceived as a general obligation which does not require the parents to continue enabling their 
children to live in the residential home to which they are accustomed. Nonetheless, in a wide 
 
114 For the transfer of accommodation as a derivative of the divorce process, see, for example, Wallerstein & 
Kelly, supra note 82 at 25-26. For the psychological price involved here, see McLanahan & Sandefur, supra note 
84,. Chapter 7. 
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variety of contexts sale of a residence ultimately also leads to an overall change of place of 
residence, as often, with only half the money received from the sale of the original flat, the 
custodial parent will find it difficult to finance a flat in the same area and consequently will be 
forced to seek a more modest flat or, alternatively, a similar size flat in a cheaper area. The 
change in accommodation and in the area of residence aggravates the psychological difficulty 
involved in divorce. Accordingly, I believe, that an approach focusing on the welfare of the child 
is likely to support conferring discretion on the court to draw a division between the ownership 
of property and occupation of the flat and enable the custodial parent to continue living in the 
residential home. Notwithstanding that such an arrangement undermines the property rights of 
the non-custodial parent it seems to me that this is one of the cases where considerations of the 
welfare of the child supersede the private, individual nature of existing spousal laws. At the same 
time, in order to limit the harm to the non-custodial spouse, I propose that the right of residence 
in the family home be granted unconditionally to the custodial parent only for the duration of an 
acclimatization period, and longer periods will only be granted in special cases in which patent 
harm would be caused to the children by requiring them to transfer. Further, I believe that 
consideration should be given to the economic harm caused to the non-custodial spouse when 
calculating maintenance payments for the children or when arranging the overall property 
relations between the parents. 
 
Like other issues considered above, there is a divergence between our proposals and the 
prevailing legal situation, and in many western countries severing the partnership in the 
residential home is perceived to be part of the property arrangements between the parents. Thus, 
for example, in Israel up to 1995, it was possible to obtain a speedy court order requiring the 
partnership in the residential home to be dissolved, without examining alternative 
accommodation options for the children of the family. In 1995 the law was amended and now a 
court ordering the dissolution of the partnership must examine whether alternative 
accommodation arrangements are available for the children. At the same time, as I mentioned, 
even the amending law is satisfied with the existence of temporary alternative accommodation 
and only very few judges are sensitive to children’s need to continue living in the family home to 
which they are accustomed. 
 
Against this criticism, it is important to point to a number of countries which have developed 
legal arrangements in the proper direction: in this spirit it was decided in England, and even in a 
number of states in the United States, that the custodial parent must be vested with 
accommodation rights in the residential home of the couple, even after the divorce, such rights to 
be unconnected to property rights.115 The case law in England is not uniform in implementing 
this provision or setting the balance between the needs of the children and the rights of the 
parents.116 At the same time, it seems to me that despite the disputes, the section and the case law 
 
115 L. J. Weitzman, “Marital Property: Its Transformation and Division in the United States”, in THE 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Oxford, L. J. 
Weitzman & M. Maclean, eds., 1992) 85, 101-105; for similar reform in California, see Kay, 21-22. For a similar 
provision in Australia, see FAMILY LAW ACT 1975 s.  79 
116 Cf., for example, the different judgments which dealt with the case of Richards v. Richards: the lower court 
held that the husband had to leave the matrimonial home as the mother, who had been left with the children, could 
not continue living with him under the same roof. The House of Lords held that raising the child, in this case, was 
not the central issue. See also the differing opinions in K v. K: the lower court judge, relying on the principle of the 
welfare of the child, ordered the father to transfer the matrimonial home to the mother, who had been left with the 
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dealing with it provide a good example of a legal arrangement which seeks to overcome the 
formal classifications and also consider the interests of children in the context of spousal laws. A 
similar arrangement which seeks to enable children to continue residing in the family home 
exists also in Canada. Thus, the Family Law Act – 24, provides that the court is entitled to grant 
the sole right of occupation to one of the spouses even if he is not the owner of the property. 
Section 24.3 provides parameters which the court must weigh before granting exclusive 
occupation. The primary criterion is: 
 
(a) the best interests of the children affected; 
 
Section 24.4 provides criteria for examining the best interest of the child: 
 
[What is best for the children is a major consideration in determining whether to grant a spouse 
exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.] 
(a) the possible disruptive effects on the child of a move to other accommodation; and 
(b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained. 
 
iv. Agreements and Representations 
 
Another ramification of the modern division between regulating parenthood and regulating the 
spousal connection is connected to the legal attitude to agreements between the spouses / parents. 
According to modern thinking, where reference is to issues classified as spousal, i.e., the 
property relations between spouses and their economic responsibilities, it is necessary to aspire 
to apply liberal principles of freedom of contract. In contrast, in so far as reference is to 
agreements dealing with children, such as support of children and custody of children, more 
stringent public oversight must be exercised over the agreements. In this spirit, it is stated even in 
modern laws which reveal a clear trend towards broadening legal enforcement of premarital 
agreements and divorce settlements, that agreements dealing with the custody of children or 
agreements that impair children’s rights to support, will not be enforced according to regular 
criteria.117 
Nonetheless, the analysis made in the previous sections makes it clear that even issues classified 
as spousal, such as the property relations between the spouses, may have an impact of the 
welfare of children. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the logic justifying subordinating the 
parents’ freedom of contract to the principle of the welfare of the child may also justify 
intervention in agreements between parents which prima facie deal with spousal issues. Against 
this background, I believe that the qualifications to freedom of contract in the family context 
must be drafted broadly in such a way as to clarify that every arrangement which might harm 
 
children. The order prevented the father from taking his share in the home which was his sole property. The Appeals 
Court overturned the decision and held that in this case the principle of the welfare of the child was not the 
overriding principle. 
117 See, for example, American Law Institution, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002), Section 7.09 (5) “terms of separation agreement concerning 
child support or custodial or decision making responsibility for children are not enforceable …”. 
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children is subject to review by the court even if formally the agreement deals with spousal laws, 
such as the ownership of property and methods of realizing it. 
 
Therefore I prefer the provisions drafted in Australian118 and Canadian119 statutes which enables 
the court to intervene in every matter relating to children, over more focused formulations which 
relate to issues of maintenance and custody.120 
Yet, even the broader formulation will not help if the courts will not acknowledge that property 
relations, accommodation and occasionally even the divorce itself are matters which concern 
children and allow them to intervene in the content of these agreements on grounds of children’s 
welfare. 
 
A similar implementation of my approach relates to the issue of the representation of children. In 
recent years an approach has developed holding that when a dispute arises between the parents, 
the interests and the needs of the children may be forgotten and accordingly the court dealing 
with the interests of children must ensure that the children obtain independent representation 
during litigation or, alternatively, when processes get underway to achieve an agreed settlement. 
According to customary legal thinking, independent representation of minors is obtained in the 
context of parent-child relations. In contrast, under our analysis, it would also be right to enable 
independent representation in much wider contexts such as in the contexts of divorce, property 
and accommodation. 
 
So far I have dealt with situations in which recognition of the lack of a clear distinction between 
spousal law and parent-child law supports strengthening public oversight of family agreements 
and the litigation between spouses. I now wish to present the contrary situation where it is 
actually recognition of the interconnection between these fields which may broaden freedom of 
contract in the family context. I am referring here to the often seen situation in which, during 
family negotiations, the spousal issues and the parental issues are not perceived as independent 
issues by the negotiators. Accordingly, the divorce settlement is discussed as a whole concept 
where interests conceded in the spousal arena are weighed against interests conceded in the 
parental arena and vice versa.121 
In many senses, this state of affairs is problematic from a perspective which focuses on the 
welfare of the child as there is a fear that parents will “sacrifice” the interests of their children for 
personal gain.122 Particular fear arises in situations where there is a significant discrepancy in the 
 
118 See the sec 55A to the family law act as well as the new sec 90 of that Act. 
119 See sec 56 to the Canadian Family law act  
120 See ALI, supra note 41, but it should  be admitted that even the ALI  enables courts to consider the welfare 
of a children as a criterion which determines the substantive justice of the agreement. 
121 Moreover, in many cases, even custodial and contact rights between parents and children are perceived by 
the parents as negotiable and therefore, in consideration for a concession regarding claims and rights to custody, the 
parent who concedes his rights expects a return concession in the economic field. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce”, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979). 
122 In economic language, this is a manifest case of externalizing costs, which is one of the cases in which 
judicial intervention in freedom of contract is justified. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, “The Role 
of Private Ordering in Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective”, 41 U. Toronto L. J. 533 (1991). 
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level of power of the respective spouses. In this situation the spouse with greater economic 
power might exploit the weakness of the other spouse in order to evade his obligations not only 
towards that other spouse but also towards the children. Against this background, it would seem 
that it is actually the point of view focusing on the welfare of the child which should favor a 
strict separation between the regulation of spousal relations and consensual relations, where the 
concession of children’s interests by their parents will be invalid. 
 
However, in my opinion, there are situations in which arrangements which integrate spousal 
issues with parenting issues are in the interest of children. The property concession of a home is 
also of great value from a perspective focusing on the welfare of the child. Think, for example, 
of a spouse willing to give up his share in the matrimonial home registered in the name of the 
custodial parent in consideration for a reduction in the amount of the maintenance payments 
which he is required to pay to his child. A strict division between the regulation of parenthood 
and the regulation of spousal relations may lead to the outcome whereby the reduction in the 
amount of the maintenance payments to the children will not be valid notwithstanding the 
property concession. Accordingly, spouses may be deterred from making agreements of this 
type. On the other hand, the analysis made in the previous chapters teaches that this type of 
arrangement will provide the children with stability and security and therefore it integrates well 
with the interest in the welfare of the children. Accordingly, I am of the opinion, that it is 
reasonable to engage in an overall examination of the arrangement without completely, and in 
my opinion artificially, severing the spousal components and the parental components. In cases 
where the court is persuaded that the agreement as a whole is a fair agreement which answers the 
needs of the children, it must confirm the agreement as a whole and not look at each component 
individually. 
 
In view of this stance, I believe that the trend existing in some western states to distinguish, in an 
extreme manner, between the obligation to pay maintenance to children which is calculated 
independently by administrative authorities123 and the other economic matters which the court 
considers, makes it more arduous to achieve comprehensive agreements and consequently is a 
problematic trend. Accordingly, I recommend that even when technical formulae exist for 
calculating the minimum amount of child maintenance, ways must be found to enable a deviation 
from these formulae, where in consideration for the reduction of maintenance payments to the 
child, the child or even the custodial parent receives a more generous share of the matrimonial 
property. 
 
V. Conclusion: Toward new Balance between spousal rights and parental 
responsibility 
In this study I have tried to examine the complex relations between the regulation of spousal 
relations and the regulation of parenthood. In the first stage I analysed the differences in the 
development of the two areas and the manner in which this development led the drafters of the 
law to try and distinguish between them in a stringent manner. I explained why different aspects 
of this distinction are important from a perspective which focuses on the welfare of the child. 
 
123 See, for example, the Child Support Act 1991 in England . 
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Against this line of thought, I pointed to cases in which the distinction is incompatible with the 
way in which families live and operate and how it may even undermine the welfare of the child. 
 
There are two levels at which this study may be read: 
 
At one level the study does not refute the actual distinction between spousal regulation and 
parental regulation but only indicates the cases where various issues classified today as spousal 
law possess a parental aspect. According to this line of thought, the importance of the study lies 
in the renewed delineation of the boundary between the spousal laws and parenthood laws while 
clarifying that different issues of accommodation, property and even divorce have an impact on 
parent-child relations and therefore are subject to the best interest of the child.   
 
At the same time, in my opinion, the study has an additional broader significance related to the 
actual ability to sever spousal relations and parental relations: in the prevailing legal discourse, 
there is a dichotomy between matters concerning children, in which the best interest of the child 
is the primary consideration or even the exclusive consideration and other matters in which the 
welfare of the child is not expressed in legal terms. Nonetheless, this analysis - which shows that 
even manifestly spousal matters, such as divorce laws, property relations between spouses and 
accommodation in the matrimonial home have an impact on the welfare of children - proves the 
problematic nature of the dichotomy. On one hand, the classification of these issues as matters 
connected to children and their complete subordination to the principle of the welfare of the child 
is unreasonable as it disregards the rights and needs of the parents on these issues. On the other 
hand, refusal to regard them as issues concerning children leads to the complete and 
inappropriate removal of child related considerations from the treatment of these issues. Against 
this background I believe that the great challenge facing the drafters of family law is to chart 
intermediate categories of family law which will deal both with spousal relations and with 
parental aspects and to try to propose appropriate balancing formulae which integrate the 
interests, wishes and rights of all those concerned in these issues.  
 
This leads me to a final insight: While western culture predominantly focuses on individualistic 
rights, there are certain areas of law, such as children-parents law in which responsibilities, 
duties and obligation remain central notions. One possible strategy employed by lawmakers is to 
isolate these animalist areas of law, distinguishing them from the primary legal focus on 
individuals.  This Article suggests a different approach, by integrating conceptions of 
responsibility into the liberal-Individual areas of law. The example of children and spousal law 
demonstrates the significant advantages of the letter approach.    
